Conficker (aka Downadup) remains one of the most resilient worms targeting Windows systems, exploiting MS08-067 vulnerability and propagating through network shares. Modern variants still evade detection through domain generation algorithms (DGA) and peer-to-peer communication channels.

# Python example to detect Conficker's characteristic network traffic
import scapy.all as scapy

def detect_conficker(pkt):
    if pkt.haslayer(scapy.TCP):
        # Conficker's TCP window size fingerprint
        if pkt[scapy.TCP].window == 1028 or pkt[scapy.TCP].window == 385: 
            print(f"Potential Conficker infection detected from {pkt[scapy.IP].src}")
            
scapy.sniff(prn=detect_conficker, filter="tcp", store=0)

Implement a monitoring system for DGA patterns. Conficker generates daily domains using this predictable algorithm:

// JavaScript implementation of Conficker's DGA
function generateConfickerDomains(date) {
    const seed = date.getFullYear() + date.getMonth() + date.getDate();
    const tlds = ['com', 'net', 'org', 'info'];
    const domains = [];
    
    for(let i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
        const r = (seed * i) % 0xFFFFFFFF;
        const domain = ${r.toString(16)}.${tlds[i % tlds.length]};
        domains.push(domain);
    }
    return domains;
}

This Nmap NSE script checks for vulnerable SMB services:

nmap --script smb-vuln-ms08-067 -p 445 192.168.1.0/24

For large networks, combine these PowerShell commands with your RMM tool:

# Check for Conficker registry modifications
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NetBT\Parameters -Name TransportBindName | 
Where-Object { $_.TransportBindName -ne $null }

# Verify service DLL integrity
Get-WmiObject win32_service | Where-Object { 
    $_.PathName -match "svchost\.exe" -and 
    $_.PathName -match "-k netsvcs" 
} | Select Name,PathName

• Deploy network traffic analysis tools to monitor for P2P traffic on TCP ports 44194, 51194
• Implement strict SMB signing policies across all domain controllers
• Regularly audit NetBIOS name service (UDP 137) activity
• Monitor for unexpected DNS queries to known Conficker sinkholes

For complete protection, combine these technical controls with regular patching cycles and user awareness training about removable media risks.

Conficker (aka Downadup) remains one of the most persistent worm threats for Windows systems, exploiting MS08-067 vulnerability. In enterprise environments, infected machines typically exhibit:

• Unusual outbound connections on TCP ports 139/445/593
• DNS queries for pseudo-random domains
• Disabled Windows Update and security services

Here's a Python script using Scapy to detect Conficker's network signatures:

from scapy.all import *
def conficker_detector(pkt):
    if pkt.haslayer(DNSQR):
        if len(pkt[DNSQR].qname) > 30 and '.com' not in str(pkt[DNSQR].qname):
            print(f"Potential Conficker DNS query detected: {pkt[DNSQR].qname}")
    elif pkt.haslayer(TCP) and pkt[TCP].dport in [139,445,593]:
        if pkt[IP].src in internal_ips and pkt[IP].dst not in allowed_destinations:
            print(f"Suspicious outbound connection from {pkt[IP].src}")

sniff(prn=conficker_detector, store=0)

For remote detection across multiple subnets, consider this Nmap approach:

nmap -Pn -T4 -p 139,445,593 --script smb-vuln-ms08-067.nse 192.168.0.0/24

The script checks for vulnerable systems that could be infected. Combine with:

nmap -sU -p 53 --script dns-random-txid 192.168.1.0/24

For large networks, implement these PowerShell commands to check for infection markers:

Get-Service | Where { $_.DisplayName -like "*Conficker*" -or $_.Name -eq "netsvcs" }
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | 
    Where { $_.PSObject.Properties.Value -match "[a-z]{8}\.dll" }

After detection, immediately:

1. Isolate infected machines
2. Apply MS08-067 patch (KB958644)
3. Reset all domain admin credentials
4. Block outbound traffic to known C&C servers