When dealing with legacy systems like Windows 2000 Server and Windows 2003 SP1, understanding event log storage is crucial for PCI DSS compliance. These versions use a proprietary binary format stored in:
%SystemRoot%\System32\config\ - AppEvent.evt (Application logs) - SecEvent.evt (Security logs) - SysEvent.evt (System logs)
The .evt files use a fixed-length record structure with this approximate layout:
typedef struct _EVENTLOGRECORD {
DWORD Length;
DWORD Reserved;
DWORD RecordNumber;
DWORD TimeGenerated;
DWORD TimeWritten;
DWORD EventID;
WORD EventType;
WORD NumStrings;
WORD EventCategory;
WORD ReservedFlags;
DWORD ClosingRecordNumber;
DWORD StringOffset;
DWORD UserSidLength;
DWORD UserSidOffset;
DWORD DataLength;
DWORD DataOffset;
// Variable data follows...
} EVENTLOGRECORD, *PEVENTLOGRECORD;
Financial systems logging sensitive data pose three critical challenges:
- Residual data in slack space of .evt files
- Potential credit card numbers in error messages
- System-generated backups in %SystemRoot%\system32\config\*.evt
For programmatic cleaning, use the Windows Event Log API:
HANDLE hEventLog = OpenEventLog(NULL, "Application");
if (hEventLog) {
if (!ClearEventLog(hEventLog, NULL)) {
printf("Error clearing log: %d\n", GetLastError());
}
CloseEventLog(hEventLog);
}
For physical file sanitization (Windows 2003 SP1):
# PowerShell equivalent (where available) wevtutil cl Application wevtutil cl Security wevtutil cl System
Create a custom VBScript for legacy systems:
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
objShell.Run "cmd /c for %f in (%systemroot%\system32\config\*.evt) do cipher /w:%f", 0, True
Remember that Windows 2000 requires additional steps:
- Stop the EventLog service
- Delete all .evt files
- Run disk sanitization tools
- Reboot to regenerate clean logs
On Windows 2000 Server and 2003 SP1 systems, event logs are stored as proprietary binary files with the following characteristics:
Default locations: - System: %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\SysEvent.Evt - Application: %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\AppEvent.Evt - Security: %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\SecEvent.Evt
The EVT file format uses a circular logging architecture with fixed record structures. Each log entry contains:
- 4-byte record length header
- 8-byte timestamp (FILETIME format)
- 4-byte event ID
- 2-byte event type
- Variable-length strings for message components
When dealing with financial transaction logs under PCI DSS Requirement 3.2:
Key constraints: - PAN (Primary Account Numbers) must not persist in logs beyond necessity - Audit trails must maintain integrity during modification - Clear documentation of log retention policies required
For Windows 2000/2003, the most reliable access methods are:
Option 1: Windows Event Log API
// C++ example using Win32 API
HANDLE hEventLog = OpenEventLog(NULL, "Application");
if (hEventLog != NULL) {
EVENTLOGRECORD *pevlr;
DWORD dwRead, dwNeeded;
while(ReadEventLog(hEventLog,
EVENTLOG_SEQUENTIAL_READ | EVENTLOG_FORWARDS_READ,
0, pevlr, BUFSIZ, &dwRead, &dwNeeded)) {
// Process event records here
printf("Event ID: %d\n", pevlr->EventID);
// Zero out sensitive data if found
if(pevlr->EventID == YOUR_FINANCIAL_EVENT_ID) {
memset(pevlr + pevlr->DataOffset, 0, pevlr->DataLength);
}
}
CloseEventLog(hEventLog);
}
Option 2: WMI Queries (Windows 2003)
# PowerShell 1.0 compatible script
$events = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_NTLogEvent -Filter "LogFile='Application'"
foreach ($event in $events) {
if ($event.EventCode -eq "1234") {
# Create modified copy without sensitive data
$cleanMessage = $event.Message -replace "\d{4}-\d{4}-\d{4}-\d{4}", "[PAN REDACTED]"
# Write cleaned version to new log
$event.Message = $cleanMessage
$event.Put()
}
}
For PCI-compliant log modification:
- Export original logs with wevtutil (2003):
- Filter sensitive data using XPath:
- Import cleaned data:
wevtutil epl Application application_backup.evtx
<QueryList>
<Query Id="0" Path="Application">
<Select Path="Application">*[System[EventID!=1234]]</Select>
</Query>
</QueryList>
wevtutil al application_clean.evtx /l:Application
For Windows 2000 limitations:
- No native CLI tools - must use API programming
- EVT files can become corrupted if modified directly
- Consider redirecting logs to SQL Server using custom sinks
Always validate hash signatures (SHA-256) of modified logs and maintain chain-of-custody documentation for PCI auditors.