When dealing with legacy systems like Windows 2000 Server and Windows 2003 SP1, understanding event log storage is crucial for PCI DSS compliance. These versions use a proprietary binary format stored in:
%SystemRoot%\System32\config\ - AppEvent.evt (Application logs) - SecEvent.evt (Security logs) - SysEvent.evt (System logs)
The .evt files use a fixed-length record structure with this approximate layout:
typedef struct _EVENTLOGRECORD { DWORD Length; DWORD Reserved; DWORD RecordNumber; DWORD TimeGenerated; DWORD TimeWritten; DWORD EventID; WORD EventType; WORD NumStrings; WORD EventCategory; WORD ReservedFlags; DWORD ClosingRecordNumber; DWORD StringOffset; DWORD UserSidLength; DWORD UserSidOffset; DWORD DataLength; DWORD DataOffset; // Variable data follows... } EVENTLOGRECORD, *PEVENTLOGRECORD;
Financial systems logging sensitive data pose three critical challenges:
- Residual data in slack space of .evt files
- Potential credit card numbers in error messages
- System-generated backups in %SystemRoot%\system32\config\*.evt
For programmatic cleaning, use the Windows Event Log API:
HANDLE hEventLog = OpenEventLog(NULL, "Application"); if (hEventLog) { if (!ClearEventLog(hEventLog, NULL)) { printf("Error clearing log: %d\n", GetLastError()); } CloseEventLog(hEventLog); }
For physical file sanitization (Windows 2003 SP1):
# PowerShell equivalent (where available) wevtutil cl Application wevtutil cl Security wevtutil cl System
Create a custom VBScript for legacy systems:
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") objShell.Run "cmd /c for %f in (%systemroot%\system32\config\*.evt) do cipher /w:%f", 0, True
Remember that Windows 2000 requires additional steps:
- Stop the EventLog service
- Delete all .evt files
- Run disk sanitization tools
- Reboot to regenerate clean logs
On Windows 2000 Server and 2003 SP1 systems, event logs are stored as proprietary binary files with the following characteristics:
Default locations: - System: %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\SysEvent.Evt - Application: %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\AppEvent.Evt - Security: %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\SecEvent.Evt
The EVT file format uses a circular logging architecture with fixed record structures. Each log entry contains:
- 4-byte record length header
- 8-byte timestamp (FILETIME format)
- 4-byte event ID
- 2-byte event type
- Variable-length strings for message components
When dealing with financial transaction logs under PCI DSS Requirement 3.2:
Key constraints: - PAN (Primary Account Numbers) must not persist in logs beyond necessity - Audit trails must maintain integrity during modification - Clear documentation of log retention policies required
For Windows 2000/2003, the most reliable access methods are:
Option 1: Windows Event Log API
// C++ example using Win32 API HANDLE hEventLog = OpenEventLog(NULL, "Application"); if (hEventLog != NULL) { EVENTLOGRECORD *pevlr; DWORD dwRead, dwNeeded; while(ReadEventLog(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_SEQUENTIAL_READ | EVENTLOG_FORWARDS_READ, 0, pevlr, BUFSIZ, &dwRead, &dwNeeded)) { // Process event records here printf("Event ID: %d\n", pevlr->EventID); // Zero out sensitive data if found if(pevlr->EventID == YOUR_FINANCIAL_EVENT_ID) { memset(pevlr + pevlr->DataOffset, 0, pevlr->DataLength); } } CloseEventLog(hEventLog); }
Option 2: WMI Queries (Windows 2003)
# PowerShell 1.0 compatible script $events = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_NTLogEvent -Filter "LogFile='Application'" foreach ($event in $events) { if ($event.EventCode -eq "1234") { # Create modified copy without sensitive data $cleanMessage = $event.Message -replace "\d{4}-\d{4}-\d{4}-\d{4}", "[PAN REDACTED]" # Write cleaned version to new log $event.Message = $cleanMessage $event.Put() } }
For PCI-compliant log modification:
- Export original logs with wevtutil (2003):
- Filter sensitive data using XPath:
- Import cleaned data:
wevtutil epl Application application_backup.evtx
<QueryList> <Query Id="0" Path="Application"> <Select Path="Application">*[System[EventID!=1234]]</Select> </Query> </QueryList>
wevtutil al application_clean.evtx /l:Application
For Windows 2000 limitations:
- No native CLI tools - must use API programming
- EVT files can become corrupted if modified directly
- Consider redirecting logs to SQL Server using custom sinks
Always validate hash signatures (SHA-256) of modified logs and maintain chain-of-custody documentation for PCI auditors.