During a routine security audit, I stumbled upon an instance where Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 was publicly accessible on port 80. This immediately raised red flags because:

• The service is often associated with SQL Server Reporting Services (SSRS)
• Default installations may not have proper authentication configured
• HTTPAPI/2.0 has known vulnerabilities when exposed externally

Microsoft's HTTPAPI serves as the foundation for several Windows services. When exposed to the internet, it becomes an attractive attack surface:

# Example nmap scan revealing vulnerable configuration
nmap -sV -p 80 target_ip
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open  http    Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

Attackers frequently exploit this configuration through:

1. Buffer overflow attempts (CVE-2009-0086)
2. HTTP verb tampering (TRACE, DEBUG methods)
3. Information disclosure through malformed requests

Here's what I implemented to secure the service:

# PowerShell snippet to restrict HTTPAPI access
Import-Module NetSecurity
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Block HTTPAPI External Access" 
                    -Direction Inbound 
                    -Protocol TCP 
                    -LocalPort 80 
                    -Action Block 
                    -Enabled True

For systems requiring HTTPAPI functionality:

• Configure IP restrictions in IIS (if present)
• Implement request filtering rules
• Enable proper authentication mechanisms
• Consider moving to HTTPS with valid certificates

Set up these alert rules in your SIEM:

# Sample Splunk query for HTTPAPI detection
index=security (http_user_agent="*Microsoft-HTTPAPI*" OR server="Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_port, http_request
| where count > 5

When scanning our network infrastructure, I discovered a host exposing Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 on port 80. This HTTP API is commonly associated with:

• SQL Server Reporting Services (SSRS) default configuration
• Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) services
• IIS7/8/10 HTTP stack implementations

The service banner alone reveals critical information attackers can use for fingerprinting. Consider these risks:

# Example of service fingerprinting using netcat
$ nc target-ip 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

Exposed HTTPAPI instances have been exploited in:

1. MS15-034 (CVE-2015-1635) - Remote Code Execution vulnerability
2. Information disclosure through malformed requests
3. Denial-of-service attacks against the HTTP stack

For SQL Server Reporting Services:

# PowerShell to modify SSRS configuration
$configFile = "C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\MSRS11.MSSQLSERVER\Reporting Services\ReportServer\rsreportserver.config"
(Get-Content $configFile) -replace '<UrlRoot>http://.*</UrlRoot>','<UrlRoot>https://internal.domain.com</UrlRoot>' | Set-Content $configFile
Restart-Service SQLSERVERReportingServices

Implement these firewall rules (Windows Firewall example):

netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block HTTPAPI External" dir=in action=block protocol=TCP localport=80 remoteip=external,corporate profile=public
netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="Windows Service Hardening" new enable=yes

After implementing controls, verify using:

# Nmap verification command
nmap -sV --script=http-title -p80 target-ip

# Expected safe output (when properly secured)
80/tcp filtered http

For WCF services using HTTPAPI, modify web.config:

<system.serviceModel>
  <serviceHostingEnvironment>
    <baseAddressPrefixFilters>
      <add prefix="https://internal.domain.com"/>
    </baseAddressPrefixFilters>
  </serviceHostingEnvironment>
</system.serviceModel>