SPF Fail vs. SoftFail: Technical Trade-offs for Email Security and Deliverability


2 views

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) provides two primary mechanisms for handling unauthorized emails:

  • -all (Fail): Explicit rejection of non-compliant emails
  • ~all (SoftFail): Treats non-compliant emails as suspicious but not definitively malicious

Here's how these mechanisms appear in DNS TXT records:

# Strict Fail implementation
"v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.0/24 -all"

# SoftFail implementation
"v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.0/24 ~all"

When implementing SPF policies, consider these technical factors:

Email Forwarding Challenges

SoftFail (~all) often becomes necessary when dealing with email forwarding services. Here's a common scenario:

Original SPF: "v=spf1 include:_spf.example.com -all"
Forwarded email scenario: Fails SPF check when forwarded through third-party

Security vs. Deliverability Trade-off

The decision matrix for choosing between Fail and SoftFail:

Factor Fail (-all) SoftFail (~all)
Security High (blocks unauthorized senders) Medium (marks but delivers)
False Positives Higher risk Lower risk
Phishing Protection Strong Moderate

Major providers demonstrate different approaches:

# Google's SPF (SoftFail)
"v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

# Enterprise strict implementation example
"v=spf1 ip4:203.0.113.1 ip4:198.51.100.1/24 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all"

For developers implementing SPF, consider this phased approach:

  1. Start with SoftFail and monitor rejections
  2. Analyze SPF failure reports using tools like:
# Sample SPF validation check
import dns.resolver

def check_spf(domain):
    try:
        answers = dns.resolver.resolve(domain, 'TXT')
        for rdata in answers:
            if 'v=spf1' in str(rdata):
                return str(rdata)
    except:
        return "No SPF record found"

For systems handling high-value communications:

  • Combine SPF Fail with DMARC reject policy for strongest protection
  • Implement SPF macro tools for complex environments
  • Consider using SPF failure reporting (RFC 6652)

Here's an example DMARC record that complements strict SPF:

"v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

The SPF protocol's Fail (-all) and SoftFail (~all) mechanisms represent fundamentally different security postures. Here's how major ESPs implement them:

# Gmail's SPF record (SoftFail)
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all

# Enterprise strict example (Hard Fail) 
v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.0/24 -all

Large-scale providers show divergent approaches:

# Microsoft 365 (Mixed approach)
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all

# Amazon SES (SoftFail default)
v=spf1 include:amazonses.com ~all

When implementing SPF validation logic:

// Pseudo-code for SPF evaluation
function evaluateSPF(email) {
  const spfRecord = fetchSPF(email.domain);
  if (spfRecord.includes('-all')) {
    return checkIP(strictMode);
  } else {
    return checkIP(lenientMode); 
  }
}

The forwarding problem explains why SoftFail persists:

# SPF breaks on forwarding (common scenario)
Original Server → Forwarding Server → Recipient
                SPF breaks here

Metrics from enterprise deployments show:

  • Hard Fail blocks 15-20% more phishing attempts
  • SoftFail reduces false positives by 30-40%

For most organizations, a phased approach works best:

# Transitional SPF record
v=spf1 include:_spf.yourprovider.com ~all

# Final enforcement (after monitoring)
v=spf1 include:_spf.yourprovider.com -all

Essential SPF monitoring tools:

# SPF validation check
dig TXT example.com | grep spf

# DMARC reporting tool
python3 dmarc-parser.py < report.xml